United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit



APPENDIX

IN THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

DOCKET NO. 76-1273

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE,

V.

JON GREGORY MARKS,

APPELLANT.

APPENDIX TO BRIEF OF APPELLANT JON GREGORY MARKS

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HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 06103
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT



PAGINATION AS IN ORIGINAL COPY

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1974	TV TODGEDUNGS to resound!	1
1/27	Defendant's Submission of Voir Dire Questions,	
1/27	JURY TRIAL - Voir Dire Questions, filed by Atty. Cramer - 12 Jurors and 1 Alternate impanelled and sworn. Jury excused until notified by Clerk's Office. (Clarie, J.)	
2/23	CHANGE OF PLEA of guilty to count #1 entered. All other counts to be dismissed at time of sentencing Same bond to continue - Continued for presentance report. (Clarie, J.) Court exh.A, Intention To Enter A Guilty Plea, filed. (Clarie, J.)	ž •
12/17/75	Marshal's executed return filed. (Summons)	
10/15/75	Marshal's executed return filed. (Clerk's	
	Temporary Commitment)	
12/23/75	Certified mail returned marked unknown and filed. (Summons)	
3/31	Court Reporter's notes of Proceedings held on Feb. 23, 1976, filed in Hartford. (Sperber, R.)	
4/14	CJA 23, Financial Affidavit, filed.	
4/22	Court Reporter's Sound Recording of Proceedings held on Jan. 5, 1976, filed in Hfd. (Collard, R.)	
4/22	Court Reporter's notes of Proceedings held on Jan. 5, 1976, filed in Hfd. (Collard, R.)	
4/23	Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, filed.	
4/26	Court Reporter's transcripts of Proceedings held on Feb. 23, 1976, filed in Hfd. (Sperber, R.)	
4/27	Endorsement entered and filed on Motion to	
	Withdraw Guilty Plea, "April 26th, 1976. Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea granted; case assigned at Waterbury on May 20, 1976, for trial. So Ordered."	
	(Clarie, J.) M. 4-27-76. Copies sent to Counsel of Record.	
4/26	Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea - Granted. Assigned to Case #1 before Judge Murphy, Waterbury, May 20, 1976. Same bond cont'd. (own recog.) (Clarie, J.)	i
5/5	Notice of Compliance with Standing Order on Discovery, filed.	
5/5	Notice of Compliance with Standing Order on Discovery, filed.	
5/5	Application for Writ of H.C. Ad Testificandum with Order, thereon, filed. (Clarie, J.) M. 5-5-76. Two copies given to U.S. Marshal and One copy to Public Defender.	
5/10	_Court Reporter's Sound Recording of Proceedings	
5/20	held or Feb. 23, 1976, filed in Hfd. (Sperber, R.) JURY TRIAL Ready - Jury selection to be held on May 24, 1976. Trial for May 25, 1976. (Murphy, J.)	,
5/24/76	JURY TRIAL - Govt. moves to allow Thurl Stalnaker, Law Student Intern to sit at counsel table during trialmotion granted. 42 jurors respond to roll call. Oath on Voir Dire administered. Govt.'s proposed Jury Cuestions, filed. Court described case to jury. 12 Jurors sworn and impanelled. Jurors remain for selection in other cases. Testimon	,
	to begin on May 25, 1976 at 10:00 a.m. (Murphy, J.)	

-	14g 2 Crna1 H-/5-2	06
DATE	PROCEEDINGS	
1976		
5/25	JURY TRIAL - 12 jurors present. Deft's. Oral Motion that all Witnesses be Sequestered - Granted. 4 Govt.	
	that all Witnesses be Sequestered - Crantod & Court	
	witness sworn & testified. Govt. Exhibits #1 & #2,	
	Govt. Exhibits #4-13, filed. 1:59 Govt. Rests. Jury excused. Deft's. Motion For a Judgment of Acquittal -	* 4 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
	excused Deft's Motion For a Tild Gove. Rests. Jury	
	Motion Denied Deft Strate Addition of Acquittal -	
	mouton benied. Dell. Sworn & recritical 4:40 second	•
	for the jury. In the absence of the jury the Court	
	discusses testimony to be brought in with offer of	
	proof by Counsel for Deft. 3:45 jury enters courtroom. Continued examination of Deft. Court adjourned until	
	Continued examination of Deft. Court adjourned until	
	3-20-70. (Mul phy, J.)	
5/26	JURY TRIAL continues. Memorandum ' Support of Deft.	
	Mark's Request for an Entrapment truction filed	
	Deft's. Request to Charge, filed. 12 jurors present.	
	Deft. resumes stand for further testimony. Defense	
	witness #1 sworn & testified. Def. rests at 11:17	
	Govt. rebuttal witness #1 sworn & testified Court	
	exhibit #14. filed. Govt rests at 11:30 June	
	excused. Deft's Motions previously made reported 6	
	excused. Deft's. Motions previously made renewed & denied. The Court advises counsel of Rulings on	
	Requests for Charge, Exceptions noted. Govt. counsel	
	informs the Court a witness has been threatened in	
	chis case & therefore would not testify. Affidavit of	
	M. Hatcher Norris handed to the Court for in-camera	
	inspection. Jury enters courtroom at 12:48. Summations	
	from 12:49 to 1:42. Court's charge from :42 to 2:05.	
	No exceptions to charge noted in Charles 1100.	
	No exceptions to charge noted in Chambers. Indictment	
	and all full exhibits taken to the jury room by the	
	Marshal's & the jury starts to deliberate at 2:07.	
	Note received from the jury at 3:17 marked Court	
	Exhibit #1, marked for identification. Note received	
	from the jury at 3:42 marked Court Exhibit #2, marked	
-	for identification. Court's charge on portion requested	
	de J.4J-J.Ho. July returns for further deliberation	
	court adjourned in the case at 5:00 p.m. to continue	
	at 10:00 a.m., 5/2///6. (Murphy, J.)	
5/27	JURY TRIAL continues. 12 Jurors present. Jurors start	
	to deliberate at 10:00 a.m. Note from jury at 10.25	
No.	and reply by the Court sent to the jury room Court	
	informs the jury the length of time to read portions	
	of testimony requested. Court Exhibite #3 4 5 & 6	
	marked for identification. Jury returns for further	
	deliberations at 11:28, 12:45-17:47 note from	
	Jury read to counsel. Jury enters courtroom at 1:20	
	P.M. with a verdict of guilty on all counts Vordict	
	p.m. with a verdict of guilty on all counts. Verdict accepted by the Court. Jury polled at request of Deft.	
	1.25 Turore excused DISPOSITION (
	1:25 Jurors excused. DISPOSITION - 6 yrs. impr. on	
	counts #1,2,3,4,5,6,7,9 & 10 to run concurrently with	
	each other, and 5 yrs. on ct. #8 to run concurrently	
	with sentences imposed on other counts. Pursuant to	
	provisions under Title 18 USC Section 3148, because	
	there is danger to community or some members of com-	
	munity the risk is too great to permit freedom or	
	bail & accordingly placed in custody of Attorney Gen. pending appeal. Deft. advised of right to appeal	
200	pending appear. Delt. advised of right to appear	
D. C. 109 Crin	sinal Continued Continued	3 3

	CI III. H-73-206
DATE	PROCEEDINGS
5/27	if unable to file an appeal clerk to file notice without fee. Govt.
ont'd.	requests a \$25,000 bond with surety pending appeal. Deft. advised
one a.	he would not benefit under the YCA. 2:30 Court adjourned.
	(Murphy, J.)
6/4	Judgment and Commitment Order, filed. (Murphy, J.) M. 6-7-76.
91.1	Two attested copies handed US Marshal's Office and one attested copy
	handed US Probation Officer.
6/3	Notice of Appeal, filed. Copies disbursed to Attys. Cramer and
	Norris.
6/4	Certified copies of Notice of Appeal and Docket Entries mailed to
	USCA.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

CRIMINAL NO. #-15-206

JON CREGORY MARKS

INDICTMENT

The Grand Jury charges:

COUNT ONE

That on or about the 10th day of September, 1973, in the District of Connecticut, JON GREGORY MARKS, the defendant herein, wilfully and knowingly possessed a certain firearm, to wit: a Savage 12 gauge short-barreled shotgun, Model 944, Series A, serial number: P-629614, having a barrel length of approximately 11 15/16 inches and an overall length of approximately 24 3/4 inches, which firearm had not been registered to him in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record.

In violation of Title 26, United States Code, Sections 5861(d) and 5871.

2 -COUNT TWO That on or about the 10th day of September, 1975, in the District of Connecticut, JON GREGORY MARKS, the defendant herein, wilfully and knowingly did transfer a firearm, to wit: a Savage 12 gauge short-barreled shotgun; Model 944, Series A, serial number: P-629614, having a barrel length of approximately 11 15/16 inches and an overall length of approximately 24 3/4 inches, in violation of the provisions of Chapter 53 of Title 26, United States Code. In violation of Title 26, United Stares Code, Sections 5861(e) and 5871. COUNT THREE That on or about the 17th day of September, 1975, in the District of Connecticut, JON GREGORY MARKS, the defendant herein, wilfully and knowingly possessed a certain firearm, to wit: a Sloan 12 gauge short-barreled double barrel shotgun, serial number: 83662, having a barrel length of approximately 12 inches and an overall length of approximately 26 inches, which firearm had not been registered to him in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record. In violation of Title 26, United States Code, Sections 5861(d) and 5871. App. 6

COUNT FOUR

That on or about the 17th day of September, 1975,
in the District of Connecticut, JON GREGORY MARKS, the
defendant herein, wilfully and knowingly did transfer a
firearm, to wit: a Sloan 12 gauge short-barreled double.
barrel shotgun, serial number: 83662, having a barrel length
of approximately 12 inches and an overall length of approximately
26 inches, in violation of the provisions of Chapter 53
of Title 26, United States Code.

In violation of Title 26, United States Code,
Sections 5861(e) and 5871.

COUNT FIVE

That on or about the 17th day of September, 1975, in the District of Connecticut, JON GREGORY MARKS, the defendant herein, wilfully and knowingly possessed a certain firearm, to wit: a Savage 12 gauge short-barreled shotgun, Model 944, Series A, serial number: P-629608, having a barrel length of approximately 12 inches and an overall length of approximately 18 3/4 inches, which firearm had not been registered to him in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record.

In violation of Title 26, United States Code, Sections 5861(d) and 5871.

That on or about the 17th day of September, 1975, in the District of Connecticut, JON GREGORY MARKS, the defendant herein, wilfully and knowingly did transfer a firearm, to wit: a Savage 12 gauge short-barreled shotgun, Model 944, Series A, serial number: P-629608, having a barrel length of approximately 12 inches and an overall length of approximately 18 3/4 inches, in violation of the provisions of Chapter 53 of Title 26, United States Code.

In violation of Title 26, United States Code, Sections 5861(e) and 5871.

COUNT SEVEN

That on or about the 10th day of October, 1975, in the District of Connecticut, JON GREGORY MARKS, the defendant herein, wilfully and knowingly possessed a certain firearm, to wit: a Remington 12 gauge short-barreled shotgun with folding stock, Model 870, serial number: S821859V, having a barrel length of approximately 12 1/2 inches and an overall length of approximately 33 1/2 inches, which firearm had not been registered to him in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record.

In violation of Title 26, United States Code, Sections 5861(d) and 5871.

COUNT EIGHT

That from on or about the 14th day of July, 1975, to on or about the 10th day of October, 1975, in the District of Connecticut, JON GREGORY MARKS, the defendant herein, not being a federally licensed dealer in firearms, did wilfully, knowingly and unlawfully engage in the business of dealing in firearms without a federal license.

In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 922(a)(1) and 924.

COUNT NINE

That on or about the 10th day of September, 1975, in the District of Connecticut, JON GREGORY MARKS, the defendant herein, wilfully, knowingly and unlawfully did make a firearm, to wit: a Savage 12 gauge short-barreled shotgun, Model 944, Series A, serial number: P-629614, having a barrel length of approximately 11 15/16 inches and an overall length of approximately 24 3/4 inches, in violation of the provisions of Chapter 53 of Title 26, United States Code.

In violation of Title 26, United States Code, Sections 5861(f) and 5871.

COUNT TEN

That from on or about the 26th day of September, 1975, to on or about the 10th day of October, 1975, in the District of Connecticut, JON GREGORY MARKS, the defendant herein, wilfully, knowingly and unlawfully did make a firearm, to wit: a Remington 12 gauge short-barreled shotgun with folding stock, Model 870, serial number: S821859V, having a barrel length of approximately 12 1/2 inches and an overall length of approximately 33 1/2 inches, in violation of the provisions of Chapter 53 of Title 26, United States Code.

In violation of Title 26, United States Code, Sections 5861(f) and 5871.

A TRUE BILL

Foreman

PETER C. DORSEY

United States Attorney

M. HATCHER NORRIS

Assistant United States Attorney

that are charged in the indictment, made the weapons that are charged in the indictment, transferred the weapons that are charged in the indictment and dealt with the four weapons,

Government Exhibit 1, 2, 4 and 11, not being a federally licensed dealer in firearms, he knew very well that he was breaking the law. He had every intention of committing a criminal act, and the agents most certainly in light of all the testimony here, I submit to you, did nothing to implant that criminal intent in his mind. The defendant was merely afforded the opportunity to do what he wanted to do, sell some weapons and make some money.

I submit to you in light of this evidence there is only one verdict that you can reach, and that is guilty to all ten counts of the indictment.

Thank you very much for your attention throughout the trial, through closing arguments, and I now leave the Government's case of the United States versus John Gregory Marks in your hands.

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, I'm sure that you can agree with me that this has been a relatively short case, and I think an interesting

short and interesting or long and dull it's always an important case because it is a criminal case, and the criminal case is important to the defendant and to the Government. And oddly enough, the most important part of the case is the part that you people are going to play in a short while because you are going to decide whether this defendant, Mr. Gregory Marks, is guilty or not guilty on each of ten separate charges.

I suggest to you that you decide those issues of guilt or innocence according to the oath that you took on Monday. You recall that you promised us through the Clerk that you will well and truly try the issues joined in this case and a true verdict render, and I submit that you cannot arrive at a true verdict if for one moment you permit any kind of an emotion to enter into your thinking or your deliberations, and by emotions

I mean emotions like sympathy or bias or prejudice.

I'm sure you know that when you are trying to decide an important matter at home or in business, if you let emotions sneak into your thinking processes, then you always make the wrong decision.

So I suggest that to be true to your oath, you

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decide the case coldly and analytically according to the evidence that you heard and saw in the courtroom, and in that way justice will be done and that is all anybody asks for or all that anybody is entitled to.

Now, one of the obligations that you have as you promised me under oath was that you would accept from me the law as I give it to you and not apply your own concepts of what the law is or what it should be. On the other hand, you are the sole and exclusive judges of the facts in the case, and not only that, but it is your recollection of the testimony that controls, not my recollection or the lawyers' recollection, but yours alone.

Now, Mr. Marks has been indicted by a Grand Jury in this District. That indictment was filed on December 12th of last year, and it contains a number of counts. I'm sure you know that an indictment is only an accusation. It is the physical means by which a defendant is brought to trial and its sole purpose is to identify the defendant's alleged offenses. It is not evidence that the offenses charged were committed, and it may not be considered by you as evidence during your jury deliberations.

Now, to that accusation or those accusations the defendant has previously pleaded not guilty, and under our system once a person who is accused of a crime is presumed to be innocent from the moment he is accused, during all of the time it takes from that moment to the trial to get underway. The presumption stays with him during the trial and the presumption stays with him not only during the trial, but during your jury deliberations until such time if the time arrives when you are satisfied that the Government has proved his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Now, I am not going to read the whole indictment to you again, but I am going to say that the way it is drawn up it can easily be divided so that you can understand the various counts. Counts 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 each relate to a different weapon. One, the odd numbered counts refer to the possession charge, and the even numbered counts refer to the transfer charge. So you have count 1 as the possession charge, count 3 as a possession charge, count 5 as a possession charge, and count 2 as a transfer charge, count 4 as a transfer charge, and count 6 as a transfer charge, and so is count 7. In other words, count --

no. Count 7 is a possession charge. So you have, in effect, four possession charges and three transfer charges.

Count & is a charge that accuses the defendant of engaging in the business of dealing in firearms, and count 9 and 10 each refer to the making of a firearm.

Now, you will notice when you read the indictment, and you will have the actual indict. It in the jury room with you, that each of the counts I through 10 all have the words "knowingly" and "intentionally" in them.

Now, an act is done intentionally when it is done with the specific intent to do that which the law forbids. That is to say with a bad purpose either to disobey the law or to disregard the law.

The purpose of adding the word
"knowingly" was to make sure that no one would be
convicted because of an act done due to a mistake
or inadvertence or some other innocent reason
cause.

Intention and knowledge of a defendant need not be proved by direct evidence. Like any other fact in the case, it may be established by

circumstantial evidence.

Now, since it is not possible to look into a person's mind to see what went on, you decide the issue of criminal intent from the evidence of acts and conduct and circumstances and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them. What a man does is more often indicative of his intent to commit an offense rather than what he says.

Now, as I told you, these counts can be divided so that you can in your discussion analyze them from a possession point of view or transfer point of view, a making point of view, and the last one, the doing of business as is charged in count 8.

Now, I will explain the various elements that are necessary for the Government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt with regard to each of the types of crimes that are alleged; namely, I will give you the necessary elements that the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt with regard to the possession charges, and I will give you the necessary elements the Government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt with regard to the transfer charges, and I will do the same thing with regard to the charges alleging the making of

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firearms and, lastly, with regard to the engaging in the business of dealing in firearms.

Now, Congress has defined the word
"firearm" which is used in all of these counts as
a shotgun having a barrel or barrels of less than
18 inches in length. Congress has said that it is
unlawful for any person to possess a firearm which
is not registered to him in the National Firearms
Registration and Transfer Record.

And now with those two definitions in mind, the essential elements that the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt with reference to counts 1, 3, 5 and 7, the possession counts, are (1) that the defendant at the time and place charged in the indictment knowingly possessed the shotgun described in each of those counts with a barrel less than 18 inches in length; and secondly, that such shotgun at the time and place charged was not registered to the defendant in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record.

Now, the Government has introduced in evidence a Certificate of the Custodian of the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record to the effect that he has made a diligent search and has found no record of any firearms described

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in the indictment being registered to the defendant. You may accept this Certificate as evidence that the shotgun as described in counts 1, 3, 5 and 7 of the indictment were not registered to the defendant, but you are not obliged to do so. It is up to you to determine what evidence you will accept and what evidence you will reject.

Now, with reference to the transfer counts, namely, counts 2, 4 and 6, Congress has passed a law which says it shall be unlawful for any person to transfer a firearm in violation of a particular statute, and that statute says it shall be unlawful for any person to transfer a firearm except in pursuance of a written order from the person seeking to obtain such article on an application form issued in blank and in duplicate for that purpose by the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate.

So the essential elements that the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt with reference to counts 2, 4 and 6, the transfer counts, are (1) that the defendant at the time and place charged in the indictment wilfully and knowingly transferred the shotgun described in each of those counts with a barrel less than 18 inches in length;

and secondly, that the transfer of such firearm
was in violation of the statute, which I just read
to you about transferring it only pursuant to a
written order on the application form issued by
the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate.

Now, with reference to counts 9 and 10, that is the making of a firearm, Congress has provided it shall be unlawful for any person to make a firearm in violation of a certain federal law which requires among other things the registration of the firearm that is made and on the form prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate.

Accordingly, the essential elements
that the Government must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt with reference to counts 9 and 10 are (1)
that the defendant at the time and place charged
in the indictment wilfully and knowingly did make
the firearm described in each of those two counts;
and secondly, that the making of said firearm was
in violation of the requirement that I just read
relating to the registration on the official form
prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury or his
delegate.

And now in connection with the remaining

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count, count 8, Congress has passed a law which provides it shall be unlawful for any person other than a licensed dealer to engage in the business of dealing in firearms. Now, the essential elements with regard to this crime which the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt are (1) that the defendant at the times and places charged in count 8 wilfully and knowingly did engage in the business of dealing in firearms; and (2) that the defendant was not a federally licensed dealer in firearms during the times charged in that count.

Now, the Government has introduced in evidence another Certificate, Exhibit No. 13, which is the Certificate of the supervisor, Firearms and Explosive Licensing Section, Regulatory Enforcement, Eureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms to the effect that she has made a diligent search and has found no record of either an executed or a filed application for a firearms license under Chapter 44 of Title 18 of the United States Code in the name of John Gregory Marks.

You may as I said with regard to the other certificate accept this certificate as evidence that on the date set forth in count 8 of the indictment John Gregory Marks was not a

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federally licensed dealer in firearms, but you are not obligated to accept it. You may accept it or

reject it as you deem right.

Now, one of the big issues in this case is the issue of credibility. I saw a play many years ago on Broadway called "A Cat On A Hot Tin Roof." Maybe you saw it too. I think there was a movie with Elizabeth Taylor in it. And in the Broadway show the principal character was called "Big Daddy", and the plot concerned the decadence of a southern family, and all Big Daddy could say throughout the last act "There's been mendacity here. There's been mendacity." And as you know, mendacity is just a fancy word for Tying, and I submit to you that there has been lying in this courtroom for two days, and your job is to find out who is telling the truth. Nobody that I know has come up with a mechanical way or means of deciding where the truth lies. Nobody has invented a slide rule or a caliper for measuring credibility, but everybody seems to agree that you do it according to your own God given common sense. You know when you are a jury man or jury woman you come here and you bring with you your common sense. You don't leave it home. So I suggest

to you that you apply your good God given common sense in order to determine credibility of each and every witness. Did any witness have a reason for lying? Was his memory as good as he said it was? Did they have an interest in the result of the trial? You determine all these things, as I said, by applying your own good common sense, and if you find that any person, any witness testified to a material fact falsely, then you are at liberty to disregard that testimony or you can accept what you believe and reject what you don't, or if you wish, you can reject that witness' testimony completely and in its entirety.

Now, the defendant here has a defense that he was entrapped into these crimes and, therefore, he cannot be convicted. If you find that the defendant was entrapped, then you must find him not guilty of all of the crimes charged in the indictment. Entrapment occurs only when the criminal conduct was the product of the creative activity of law enforcement officials. The function of law enforcement is the prevention of crime and the apprehension of criminals. Manifestly, that function does not include the manufacturing of crime. Criminal activity is such that stealth

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and stratagems are necessary weapons in the arsenal of police officers. However, a different question is presented when the criminal design originates with the officials of the Government and when they implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its commission in order that they may prosecute. This stealth and strategy becomes as objectionable as a police method such as coerced confessions or unlawful search. Congress never intended that its statutes were to be enforced by tempting innocent people into violations. However, the fact that the Government merely affords opportunity or facilities for the commission of an offense doesn't constitute entrapment. To determine whether entrapment has been established a line must be drawn between the trap for the unwary and the innocent and the trap for the wary criminal. It must be obvious, therefore, that your examination will be the determination of the issue of fact: was the defendant entrapped? In considering that issue bear in mind that the burden is on the defendant to adduce some evidence that a Government agent by initiating the illegal conduct himself induced the defendant to commit the offense. If

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you find that the defendant has adduced such evidence, then the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the inducement was not the cause of the crime, that is, that the defendant was ready and willing to commit the offense.

The defendant also has as another defense the defense of coercion. Now, coercion or compulsion may be a legal defense for all of the crimes charged in this indictment. In order, however, to provide a legal defense for any criminal conduct, the compulsion must be present. It must be immediate and of such a nature as to induce a well founded fear of impending death or serious bodily injury, and there must be no reasonable opportunity to escape the compulsion without committing the crime or participating in its commission. If the evidence in this case should leave you with a reasonable doubt, whether at the times and places of the alleged offenses the accused acted willingly and voluntarily, that is to say, whether the accused was forced, in effect, to commit the crimes charged in the indictment by coercion or compulsion as I have explained it, then you must acquit the defendant.

Now, the defendant here has taken the

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stand in his own behalf. I'm sure you know that under our system a defendant need not testify if he wishes. He is under no obligation to prove anything. The obligation to prove his guilt is always on the Government throughout the entire trial. The defendant, however, who testifies has a deep personal interest in the prosecution and that interest should be considered by you. Interest, as you know, creates a motive for false testimony, and the greater the interest, the stronger the motive. Bearing in mind I am not saying that because a person has an interest in the case that they are incapable of telling a straight-forward and candid and truthful story because if that was so, no defendant would ever have a chance in court. You know as well as I do that it is possible and frequently happens that a person who has an interest can tell a straight-forward and honest story, but I repeat, the question of credibility of each witness, including all of the Government witnesses and the defendant and his witnesses is in your entire control and your responsibility.

And now throughout my charge and the lawyers' summations we all have been using the phrase "reasonable doubt". It must be obvious to

you that in all criminal cases the burden is on the Government to prove the guilt of a defendant by what is called proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and that burden, as I say, remains on the Government

and never shifts to a defendant.

Now, what is reasonable doubt? It is a doubt based upon reason which arises from the evidence or lack of evidence. A reasonable doubt is not a vague or an imaginary or speculative doubt, but it is such a doubt as to cause a good man or woman to hesitate before acting in matters of importance to themselves.

Now, under your oath as jurors one of the things that you cannot do, assuming that you arrive at a verdict of guilt, is to consider or discuss the question of possible punishment. The question of punishment of a person who is convicted of a crime belongs on the conscience of the Court and on nobody else's conscience. The lawyers have their job to do. They do it by presenting the evidence to the best of their ability. You have your job to do, that is, to decide the facts to the best of your ability; and my job is to run the court and pass on questions of law, and in the event of a verdict of guilty, to impose punishment.

So let us not encroach on each other's job.

And now one more word and I will have

done. If you find that the law has not been violated
as charged, you should not hesitate for any reason
to return a verdict of not guilty. On the other
hand, if you find that the defendant has been proved
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, say so, and do
not hesitate because of any emotion such as sympathy
or bias or prejudice.

I am sure you know that when you do
retire to your jury room, you elect one of your own
members as Foreman or Forelady, and he or she will
monitor or be your supervisor during your deliberations and then represent you when you return a
verdict in court.

I'm sure you know that your verdict must be unanimous on each count.

Now, I have to speak to the lawyers for a few minutes and the rules say I must do it in your absence, so would you excuse us for just a short time.

(The following transpired in chambers)

THE COURT: Mr. Cramer, do you have any exceptions?

1	please.
2	BY MR. CRAILER:
3	was there any attempts after that to collect
4	money from you by Mr. Duggan:
5	A Yes. Ik. Duggan felt
6	THE COURT: No or yes would enswer the ques-
7	'tion.
8	MR. CRALER: I'm not sure he answered the
9	question.
10	THE WITHESS: Yes. Mr. Duggan made numerous
11	attempts to collect his money.
12	THE COURT: To collect the . new that you
13	guaranteed, you mean:
14	THE WITNESS: To collect what he felt was the
15	contractual obligation.
16	THE COURT: Did he hire a lawyer?
17	THE WITHESS: No, your Honor. No did not.
18	DY MR. CRAMMR:
19	Q Did you contact a lanyar?
20	A Yes. I did. I contacted Mr
21	THE COURT: The answer is "yes".
22	Q Who was the lawyer you contacted?
24	A It was Dick Spear of 100 Constitution Plaza. He
	is also known to me.

THE COURT: No. Please, Den't give us a

1	whole life history. You gave us the name of the
2	lawyer and his address. If counsel wents any
3	more information about the man, he will ask you.
4	Were you able to receive this debt with Mr. Dugger
5	A Ro. 1 was not.
6	Q Did he make any suggestion to you how you should
7	pay off this debt?
8	A lim. Duggen stated that I was obligated to him and
. 9	that I had better got the money or else.
10	Q hall, did he tell you how you could raise the
11	money?
12	A I offered to liquidate
13	THE COURT: No. The queenion was: Did Mr.
14	Deggan tell you how you could raise the money?
15	THE WITHERS: Wr. Duggen did make an offer,
16	yes.
17	THE COURT: Did he tell yeu, the question
18	was, how to raise the money? That was the quas-
19	zion.
20	THE UNITES: No. He did not tell me how
21	to raise the nency.
22	THE COURT: That appears the question
23	perfectly.
24	Q Did he suggest to you how you could pay off the
25	debt?

1	A Yes. He suggested that I could liquidate some
2	unneeded personal property as well as my office equipment.
3	Did you attempt to sell your personal property?
4	A Yes, I did.
5	Were you successful?
6	A. No. I was not.
7	THE COURT: What personal property did you
8	attempt to sell?
9	THE WITNESS: I attempted to sell numerous
10	items that I had.
11	THE COURT: No. What was the personal
12	property that you attempted to sell?
13	THE WITNESS: I attempted to sell some tools
14	which I had left over from my service station
15	as well as the two hand guns that are on the top
16	of the board over there.
17	BY MR. CRAMER:
18	Q Did Nr. Duggan ever take possession of any of
19	the hand guns that you see on the board there?
20	A Yes. He did.
21	Q Could you tell the ladies and gentlemen of the
22	jury when that occurred?
23	A Yes. That occurred when he told me
24	THE COURT: First identify the guns, then
25	tell us when it as.

THE WITNESS: My recollection is that there 1 were prosecution Exhibits 1 and 2 there, the two 2 guns on the top of the board, the hand guns. 3 THE COURT: The two hand guns? THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honor. 5 THE COURT: Thank you. And when was it that 6 he took them from you? 7 THE WITNESS: I'm not specific on the dates. 8 THE COURT: No. Approximately. 9 THE WITNESS: It was -- I want to be absolutely 10 sure about this. 11 THE COURT: No. Approximately will do. 12 THE WITNESS: This would have been about two 13 and a half to three weeks after the definite fall-14 through of our business venture. Tho to three 15 16 weeks after Memorial Day. 17 BY IR. CRAMER: What did he say he was going to do with the guns? 18 MR. NORRIS: Objection, your Honor. Hearsay. 19 20 MR. CRAMER: Well, I think it goes to the 21 state of mind. 22 THE COURT: Yes, to the state of mind if 23 his state of mind at that time is relevant to the 24 issues here, I will agree. Is it going to be 25

relevant to the issues?

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MR. CRAMER: Yes, it is. I think it will be clear in the next two or three questions.

THE COURT: We will allow it.

THE WITNESS: Mr. Duggan said that he could liquidate them through a friend who is the bartender at the Holiday Inn in Meriden.

BY MR. CRAMER:

Q Now, about this time were there any threats from Mr. Duggan directed towards you?

A Mr. Duggan directed an implied threat to me.

THE COURT: No. Just tell us what the thing was that he said, and then the jury will decide whether it was a threat or an implied threat.

THE WITNESS: Oh, all right.

THE COURT: See, just tell us what he said.

THE WITNESS: Mr. Duggan said that unless

I made a sign of good faith, those were his

exact words, that my associate and also my close

friend, Tom Conway, would end up at the bottom

of the elevator shaft in the building where Arthur

Howe was working.

MR. NORRIS: Your Honor, I object and move to strike that answer and object to this whole line of questioning as being irrelevant.

MR. CRAMER: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Counsel represents that it is 1 going to be relevant soon. 2 MR. NORRIS: I realize that he said a number 3 of questions ago he was going to tie it up and still hasn't. THE COURT: He is a member of the Bar like 8 you are and I must accept his representations. 7 BY MR. CRAMER: 8 Did you feel that Mr. Duggan was serious when he 9 made this threat? 10 A I certainly did. 11 Did, in fact, Mr. Conway work at the Murray Rome 12 13 Building in Hartford? 14 Yes. He was employed by Mr. Howe. 15 Now, was this threat made just before you handed 16 over the guns to him? 17 Yes. It was. A 18 THE COURT: I thought you said he took the guns. You mean you handed the guns to him? 19 20 THE WITNESS: Yes, I did, your Honor. And what was the purpose of giving him the guns? 21 22 He indicated that he could sell them that evening 23 and that he would return with the receipts from the sale. 24 What did he say to you he had to do with the money 25 from the sale of the guns?

THE COURT: And that was how much? You can't recall what that amount was?

THE WITNESS: I really can't.

THE COURT: And then?

THE WITNESS: Then Rich without offering, without actually completing the payment took the two guns away from us and put them in his car and two seconds later all these guys swarmed around the cars with guns drawn, and then we were arrested when we found out who they were.

MR. CRAMER: I have no other questions at this point, your Honor.

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, we will take a short recess now.

(Whereupon, the jury left the courtroom.)

THE COURT: All right, Mr. Cramer.

MR. CRAMER: My offer of proof, your Honor, would be that --

THE COURT: Just tell me what the witness will testify to.

MR. CRAMER: He would testify that he was coerced by Mr. Duggan to sell guns.

THE COURT: No, counsel. We are talking about something else. You said he had to get some money from X and that's when counsel objected

because you were going to say "What kind of trouble did you have with X?" Now we are talking about the same matter, are we? Is that the offer of proof?

MR. CRAMER: Yes.

THE COURT: Tell me again. He would testify that who is X again?

MR. CRAMER: Richard Duggan.

THE COURT: Duggan.

MR. CRAMER: He would testify that he was threatened by Mr. Duggan and that if he did not pay the debt, he would suffer serious physical consequences, serious harm, physical injury, and it was under this compulsion as well as the compulsion of the acts of the agents which propelled him to sell the gurs.

THE COURT: But it's the compulsion of the agents, that is your defense in this case, is it not?

MR. CRAMER: I would raise that as an entrapment.

THE COURT: Are you claiming that it was sort of a secret employee of the Treasury?

MR. CRAMER: I don't know that because -- I
don't know that. Whether he was or not, if he

coerced the individual to commit the particular act --

THE COURT: That wouldn't be the Government.

MR. CRAMER: But it would be coercion. I think coercion could come from a private party.

THE COURT: But entrapment is when the Government makes you commit the crime.

MR. CRAMER: It wouldn't relate to entrapment though. I would think that it would show he was not ready and willing in a voluntary sense if there was an outside source, and I also think that it would be relative to the defense of coercion.

THE COURT: You mean he was forced to do
these things because Mr. Duggan threatened him
with dire consequences if he didn't pay back the
money?

MR. CRAMER: Unless he paid the money and sold the guns to pay the money.

THE COURT: Do you have something to support that?

MR. CRAMER: Well, his testimony.

THE COURT: No. I mean some cases like the Supreme Court.

MR. CRAMER: No. I don't. There are very

New cases on coercion. I researched this once before. There are only three or four cases.

THE COURT: Give me one.

MR. CRAMER: I think the case is United States versus Shannon, and I don't have the citation, your Honor.

THE COURT: Is it a District Court case?

MR. CRAMER: Well, I can't say that. I'm not

sure of the citation.

THE COURT: And what do you think the holding is?

MR. CRAMER: The holding is that if one commits a crime because of fear for his life or serious bodily harm and has no alternative other than commission of the particular act, then that is a defense to the commission of the particular act.

THE COURT: Doesn't someone who coerces have to be either part of the Government or in a state case the People or employed by them?

MR. CRAMER: No, your Honor. I'm certain of that, but I can't cite a case. The case that most strikes in my mind was a case involving some kidnappers and a group of the kidnappers said they were coerced by the other kidnappers and they w

point.

THE COURT: Do you have your notes there?

MR. CRAMER: No. I don't. I was having my secretary type up my jury instructions and they're back at my office in Hartford.

THE COURT: But you did the research some time ago?

MR. CRAMER: I did it some time ago.

THE COURT: You don't have your notes on it?

MR. CRAMER: No. I'm sorry.

THE COURT: Well, I'm not too satisfic that it is a defense in this case, although perhaps the coercion of the agents is another question. I'm not too sure. Shall I take a look and see what I can find? Shannon, you think it's a Supreme Court case?

MR. CRAMER: I'm just not certain.

THE COURT: Well, can we agree on a spelling?

MR. CRAMER: S-H-A-N-N-O-N.

THE COURT: Let's give it a try.

(Whereupon, court recessed at 3:35 p.m. and reconvened at 3:45 p.m.)

THE COURT: I'm going to permit counsel to explore that. I didn't find the Shannon case, but I found some other cases on coercion and, of

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course, I will have to charge the jury as to what 1 coercion is and how much you have to prove. I 2 don't suppose you prepared a charge on coercion? 3 MR. CRAMER: I did, your Honor. It's being 4 typed in my office now. 5 (At this time the jury entered the courtroom.) 6 THE COURT: All right, counsel, please. 7 BY MR. CRAMER: 8 Mr. Marks, during the course of these gun sales Q 9 to --10 THE COURT: No. Counsel, you said you only 11 had one question left, and I now ruled on that 12 question and permitted you to explore it according 13 to your offer of proof. Is that the last subject 14 matter? 15 16 MR. CRAMER: I just wanted to preface the 17 question for the jury's benefit. 18 THE COURT: Freface the question or give a 19 statement? 20 MR. CRAMER: Well, I will ask the question. 21 THE COURT: Yes. Fine. 22 BY MR. CRAMER: 23 In September of 1975 did you receive any threats 24 from Richard Duggan? 25 September? All right.

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MR. NORRIS: Your Honor, I object to the question. I think it's up to the jury to determine what is a threat.

THE COURT: Yes. I think so. I think you should tell us what happened between you and Mr. Duggan in late September or early September or whatever the time is.

THE WITNESS: He was not threatening at that point, but rather, he was still very persistent in getting his money. He was very much avoiding us because he feared Hank and Rich.

BY MR. CRAMER:

Q Well, was there a time before any of the sales of the guns where he made statements to you which you felt obligated you to sell the guns?

A Well, he was the person who was responsible for the introduction, and he said initially he was going to sell the guns. He was going to -- he took them from me and he said that he would handle the transaction, and then something changed his mind and he came back and he said that rather than having him handle the transaction that it would be better for me to handle it personally.

Q Well, did he say what he would do if you didn't sell the guns?

A He said that if we didn't get him some money through

Now, you heard his testimony that he paid you two

1	Q About how much of this debt did you owe?
2	A Half of it. Twenty-five hundred dollars.
3	Did you make any payments on the debt?
4	A Yes, sir.
5	Q During the summer of 1975 did Gregory Marks ever
6	express a fear of Richard Düggan to you?
7	A Yes, sir.
8	Q Do you recall what he said?
9	A Yes. He said that
10	THE COURT: Would you tell us what it was?
11	Did you fix a time?
12	IR. CRAMER: The summer of 1975, your Honor.
13	THE WITNESS: He said that I had been
14	threatened, that Richard Duggan had come to him
15	and said that I was in the Murray Rome Building
16	and that unless some money was paid as a sign of
17	good faith, I think were the words, I would be
18	thrown down an elevator shaft.
19	THE COURT: I thought the question was: Did
20	he ever tell you that he had been threatened?
21	MR. CRAMER: I think he is getting to that.
22	THE WITNESS: Then the first part wasn't
23	responsive then, I guess.
24	MR. CRAMER: Vell
25	THE COURT: He has told us about what Mr.

1 Marks told him, that his life was in danger. 2 Didn't you ask him whether Mr. Marks said to him 3 that he had been threatened, Mr. Marks? BY MR. CRAMER: 4 Could you clarify that, Mir. Mark --5 THE COURT: Answer the question, please, 6 7 responsively, if you can. 8 THE WITNESS: Yes. He said that Mr. Duggan 9 also indicated that the same could happen to him. 10 The same as you described could happen to him? 11 A Yes. 12 Were those his exact words? 13 Those were Mr. Marks' exact words, yes. A 14 Q Did you, in fact, work at the Murray Rome Building? 15 Yes. I did. A 16 How frequently did you see Mr. Marks during the 17 summer of 1975? 18 Quite frequently. Three, maybe as many as five 19 times a week. 20 Where do these meetings usually occur? 0 21 Normally in his office. A 22 Where was that? 0 23 20 Raymond Road, West Hartford. A 24 What kind of business was this that he had? Q 25 It was a promotion agency. A

THE COURT: Both sides rest? 1 MR. CRAMER: Pardon me. I'm sorry, your 2 Honor. 3 THE COURT: Both sides rest? MR. CRAFER: May I have just one minute to 5 to le to my client? 6 Defendant rests, your Honor. THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, I am going 8 to talk to the lawyers now in your absence for a few minutes and then we wil have summations. 10 I don't think we will be too long anyways. 11 (The jury left the courtroom at this time.) 12 THE COURT: Do you have a motion? Do you 13 make the same motions that you made before? 14 MR. CRAMER: Yes, your Honor. 15 THE COURT: And those motions are renewed 16 17 and denied with exception. MR. CRAMER: Exception, your Honor. 18 THE COURT: Now, tell me, gentlemen, how 19 long you wish for summations? I will talk to 20 you in a minute about the requested instructions. 21 Since you speak first, how long? 22 MR. NORRIS: Well, your Honor, perhaps my 23 length will depend on whether the court has 24 25 decided on whether it intends to give an entrapment

charge in this case.

THE COURT: I am. Yes.

MR. NORRIS: In that case, I anticipate total summation time approximately half an hour, forty minutes.

THE COURT: Counsel, you make your choice and I will hold you to whatever you say. Forty?

MR. CRAMER: I suspect fifteen, twenty minutes.

MR. NORRIS: Forty minutes.

THE COURT: Outside? Now, I will hold you to it. Twenty minutes on the outside?

MR. CRAMER: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. Now, if you would look at your requested instructions I will go over them with you.

With regard to the Government instructions, do you have them?

MR. NORRIS: Yes, your Honor.

I'm going to be very brief with all of them. I have read these instructions and I'll follow them substantially, and the only one that I have some trouble with is the -- you don't have them numbered, but it's entitled The Weight of

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Defendant's Testimony if Defendant Testifies.

MR. NORRIS: I have it.

THE COURT: I am going to charge on that, but
I am going to quote almost exclusively from a
Supreme Court case, Regan against the United
States, 157 U.S., 301 at 304, 5 and 10, 1895;
and I am going to charge entrapment substantially
as both people have asked me, but a little bit
different. I'll read it to you now so you will
understand the difference.

It is the defendant's defence that he was entrapped into committing these crimes and, therefore, he cannot be convicted. If you find that the defendant was entrapped, then you must find him not guilty of all of the charges contained in the indictment. Entrapment occurs only when the criminal conduct was the product of the creative activity of law enforcement of the prevention of crime in the apprehension of criminals. Manifestly, that function does not include the manufacturing of crime. Criminal activity is such that stealth and stratagems are necessary weapons in the arsenal of police officers. However, a different question is

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presented when the crimir 1 design originates with the officials of the Goverment, and when they implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offenses and induce their commission in order that they may prosecute, this stealth and strategy becomes as an objectionable police method as coerced confessions or the unlawful search. Congress never intended that its statutes ought to be enforced by tempting innocent people into violations. However, the fact that the Covernment merely affords opportunity or facilities for the commission of the offense does not constitute entrapment. To determine whether entrapment has been established a line must be drawn between the trap for the unwary and the innocent and the trap for the wary criminal. It must be obvious, therefore, that your examination will be the determination of the issue of fact: Was the defendant entrapped? In considering that issue bear in mind that the burden is on the defendant to adduce some evidence that a Covernment agent by initiating the illegal conduct himself induced the defendant to commit the offense. you find that the defendant has adduced such

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evidence, then the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the inducement was not the cause of the crime, that is, that the defendant was ready and willing to commit the offense.

And you don't have anything on coercion which is one of the defenses unless I missed it. Do you, Mr. Norris?

MR. NORRIS: No, I don't, your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes. All right. Now, with regard to the defendant's request -- oh, you added a rather recent request to charge called impeachment.

MR. NORRIS: Yes, your Honor, in light of my rebuttal.

THE COURT: Yes. I'm not going to charge it not because it's not accurate, but I don't think it is involved in the case. The jury can determine the credibility without getting into this question of Latin expressions and impeachment.

But anyway, you have an exception.

MR. NORRIS: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: And with regard to the defendant's requeres, I am going to follow them in substance, but much, much shorter and not as repetitious and with the exception that I told you about the

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Regan case on the credibility of the defendant, and if you are familiar with that case, I tell the jury that he has an interest greater than anybody who testified, but I am not going to discuss a great deal of the testimony. In fact, none of the testimony, if I can help it. And so I will not cover some of your requests that does go into the various facts of the case as far as the testimony of witnesses, and I told you what I am going to say about entrapment and coercion. I am going to say a little bit more than you have, but substantially what you have, and I am not going to rapeat number 7 on Page 7 since I am going to tell the jury about reasonable doubt and what the elements of the crime are throughout the charge.

Lut in any event, each of you have an exception to what I have just told you for failing to charge as you specifically requested in writing, and then, of course, you can take exception at the close of the charge in chief.

Shall we take a few minutes or shall I tell the jury to go to lunch so you have one continuous play?

MR. NORRIS: I would rather have it continuous,

your Honor, summations and then instructions rather than a break in between.

THE COURT: Is that your desire too?

MR. CRAMER: I would agree with that, your Honor. May I take exception now?

THE COURT: I gave them to you.

MR. CRAMER: Well, I wanted to object to failure to give certain instructions.

THE COURT: You have an exception to all that I told you I will not give.

MR. CRAMER: Ch, I'm sorry.

THE COURT: And you have exception after the charge in chief or an opportunity to except to the charge in chief.

MR. CRAMER: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Do I have your permission to have the clerk tell the jury to go to lunch now and not to speak to anybody or should I do it myself?

MR. CRAMER: You have my permission.

MR. NORRIS: You have my permission, your Honor.

THE COURT: Would you do that, please, tell them we are going to sum up and charge after lunch and they go now and be back at quarter to 1:00. We will all be back at quarter at 1:00.

(Whereupon, t recessed at 11:40 a.m. and reconvened at 1 +5 p.m.)

I wish to bring to the court's attention prior to the jury being brought in, and I am doing this at the direct order of the United States Attorney,

Peter C. Dorsey. A matter has come to my attention which is of grave concern to the United States

Attorney, and I believe that it is of grave concern to the court. It goes to the heart of our judicial process. We have information that a witness under a lawful order to testify in this case under subpoena has been intimidated, has been threatened. As a result of this threat and intimidation has not testified in this court, has not responded.

THE COURT: Sre you suggesting that a witness who is under subpoena did not appear?

that the reason for this non-appearance was because the witness felt that his life might be in jeopardy and he was in fear of immediate bodily harm.

THE COURT: Isn't there some provisions of law that you can present to the Grand Jury that would overcome that?

And he has presented to you basically two defenses, the defense of an entrapment and the defense of coercion.

Now, both of these defenses are recognized by the law, and I anticipate His Honor will instruct you on how you should apply that law. Now, it makes common sense that the law provides that the Government cannot take an innocent person, plant a criminal intent in their mind, and then when they do the criminal act, come out and prosecute them. That is entrappent. It's taking advantage of an innocent person. And, obviously, what you look at is what we call pre-disposition. Was the person pre-disposed to commit a criminal act of this nature?

Now, the law also states that if a person is ready and willing to commit a criminal act and merely waiting for an opportunity to commit that act and the law enforcement authorities provide that opportunity, that is not entrapment. It is the actual implanting of the criminal intent in his mind that this individual would never have been disposed to do this act had it not been for the conduct of the agents involved.

And likewise, on the coercion defense

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presented by the defendant, the law recognizes that if someone commits a criminal act under the immediate threat of infliction of serious bodily harm, that should be taken into consideration.

Well, let's look at that threat. The only evidence presented before you was from the defendant that there was a threat by a Mr. Richard Duggan. He did call Thomas Conway to the stand to confirm this threat, except Mr. Conway got on the stand and said his only knowledge of the threat was from the defendant. So, basically, we have one source for that threat.

And on the entrapment, well, the

defendant has testified that he had the weapons and
he really didn't know the man was a law enforcement
authority. There was really no convincing involved.

If the price was right, he was waiting for the
opportunity to sell the weapons to dispose of some
personal property, and he sold them. The law
enforcement authority didn't beat him. They didn't
force him to do the acts so charged in here. But
he says "I thought they were organized crime. I
was scared of them." He wasn't too scared to sell
weapons like these to organized crime, at least
believing that each one of these weapons would be

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slanted his testimony in any way to give me an impression that he wants to give me rather than giving me the facts? Because as a jury, you are the trier of fact. It is not the attorneys, it is not His Honor. You are the trier of fact. The facts are presented through evidence to you and you make the determination what to believe and what not to believe.

The defendant said he was coerced. However, he made nine phone calls to the agents. Agent Moniz testified that on two occasions he told John Marks, "I don't want to buy any more guns." More guns were sold. Agent Weronik testified that John Marks was discussing automatic weapons in lots of six or eight. In fact, Thomas Conway confirmed that with his testimony. He said "Yes. There was discussion of automatic weapons." Discussions of a lot of things. You heard discussion of marijuana came up in the testimony and Agent Weronik testified that John Marks told him concerning a lot of shotguns that he would deliver the shotguns in two pieces. Agent Weronik described the stock and the receiver in one piece and at a different time the barrel, and his testimony under oath was that the defendant stated that in this procedure he would

before you. Photographs as any other exhibit is evidence for you to consider.

And also considering frame of mind of the defendant and in the light of the entrapment defense and in view of the innocent person being duped or coerced by law enforcement authorities, remember the statement that the defendant made to Agent Weronik when he sold him Government Exhibit No. 2, a 38 caliber revolver. He said "Be careful handling those bullets. They're coated with evanide." He wants you to believe that he is an innocent party that the Federal Government has mis-handled and that he is not appropriately here, he should be acquitted.

It is also the testimony of Agent Moniz
that he said that he would consider using one of
the sawed-off shotguns in a murder, robbing places,
and that he would use it. No comment from the
cefendant when he stated this. No comment whatsoever
He was selling weapons. He would keep selling
weapons. He didn't know they were agents. As far
as he was concerned, these people were going to do
what they said they were going to do. They were
going to commit crimes with them, maybe use them
to kill somebody, and he kept cutting them down,

could say, "Well, we have some doubts. We think he may be guilty.", but some lingering doubt remains and that lingering doubt is based upon some rational basis, you must find him not guilty, and that holds true in each and every count. It is not sufficient that you think it is more likely than not he is guilty. You have to decide if there is any doubt remaining in your mind, and as I said, he concedes, we don't take issue of the fact that he did the acts alleged in the indictment. What we are talking about in this particular case, as the Government pointed out, the Prosecution pointed out is the two defenses that he raises, one of coercion and the other of entrapment.

First of all, he claims he was coerced in committing these particular offenses. He talks about a discussion with a Mr. Duggan. Mr. Duggan said that "If you don't sell the particular guns, if you don' pay me the money, then serious harm is going to come to you." Well, undoubtedly, you only have Mr. Marks' testimony as to that particular fact. You have to judge his demeanor on the stand, the way he approached it and the way he spoke in making your decision whether he is telling you the truth. But keep in mind also that you heard the

about remarks that Mr. Duggan related to him. He told you about his fears, Mr. Marks' fears of Richard Duggan. Now, it's hard to believe that way back in last summer of 1975 Mr. Marks is fabricating a fear of Mr. Duggan. If he expressed a fear of Mr. Duggan to Mr. Conway, I think it is reasonably certain that he did have that fear, and if he was motivated out of that fear to sell the first two hand guns, Government Exhibits 1 and 2, and the other guns because there was a subsequent threat by Mr. Duggan, then that is a defense, if he had no other alternative, if he had nothing other to do than to comply with the orders of Mr. Duggan.

of course, the defense of coercion includes the element you could have gone elsewhere, you could have gone to the police or run away. But Mr. Marks and Mr. Conway have explained to you that they felt there was no out. Maybe that was a poor decision. Maybe objectively as we sit here in this passive courtroom we can say "Oh, there was a way out." But think of yourselves in their position at that point in time.

The first two hand guns were sold, that we know, on July 14th. Those guns are not the

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you find that the defendant has adduced such evidence, then the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the inducement was not the cause of the crime, that is, that the defendant was ready and willing to commit the offense.

The defendant also has as another defense the defense of coercion. Now, coercion or compulsion may be a legal defense for all of the crimes charged in this indictment. In order, however, to provide a legal defense for any criminal conduct, the compulsion must be present. It must be immediate and of such a nature as to induce a well founded fear of impending death or serious bodily injury, and there must be no reasonable opportunity to escape the compulsion without committing the crime or participating in its commission. If the evidence in this case should leave you with a reasonable doubt, whether at the times and places of the alleged offenses the accused acted willingly and voluntarily, that is to say, whether the accused was forced, in effect, to commit the crimes charged in the indictment by coercion or compulsion as I have explained it, then you must acquit the defendant.

Now, the defendant here has taken the

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but not that they received the bag itself, and that is the Government's explanation.

THE COURT: Well, I don't comment on the evidence, but --

MR. NORRIS: Yes. I realize that.

THE COURT: The Court Reporter took

(Court recessed at 3:20 p.m. and receivened at 3:42 p.m.)

THE COURT: Gentlemen, I have another note from the jury that reads: "We would like to have the law as to entrapment and coersion (sic) again.", unsigned, and I assume or hope that that is the request of the jury as distinguished from a jurgr. But I am going to bring the jury in and give them what they want. Do you have something to say?

MR. CRAMER: I have no objection to that.

THE COURT: Do you have any objection?

MR. NORRIS: No objection, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Would you bring them in,

please?

THE MARSHAL: Yes, Your Honor.

(The jury entered the courtroom at this

time.)

THE COURT: All right. Thank you,
ladies and gentlemen. I have a note which reads:
"We would like to have the law as to entrapment and
coersion (sic) again." It's not signed by anyone,
and I hope it is the request of the entire jury, but
in any event, here is what I said about those two
subjects.

One of the defendant's defenses is that he was entrapped into committing these crimes and, therefore, he cannot be convicted. If you find that the defendant was entrapped, then you must find him not guilty of all of the crimes charged in the indictment.

Entrapment occurs only when the criminal conduct was the product of the creative activity of law enforcement officials. The function of law enforcement is the prevention of crime and the apprehension of criminals. Manifestly, that function does not include the manufacturing of crime. Criminal activity is such that stealth and stratagem are necessary weapons in the arsenal of police officers. However, a different question is presented when the criminal design originates with the officials of the Government and when they implant in the mind of an innocent person the

disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its commission in order that they may prosecute. This stealth and strategy becomes as an objectionable a police method as coerced confessions or the unlawful search. Congress never intended that its statutes were to be enforced by tempting innocent people into violation. However, the fact that the Government merely affords opportunities or facilities for the commission of the offense does not constitute entrapment.

established a line must be drawn between the trap for the unwary and the innocent and the trap for the wary criminal. It must be obvious, therefore, that your examination will be the determination of the issue of fact: Was the defendant entrapped? In considering that issue bear in mind that the burden is on the defendant to adduce some evidence that a Government agent by initiating the illegal conduct himself induced the defendant to commit the offense. If you find that the defendant has adduced such evidence, then the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the inducement was not the cause of the crime, that is, that the defendant was ready and willing to commit the

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offense.

The defendant, as I said, also has the defense of coercion. Coercion or compulsion may be a legal defense for the crimes charged in the indictment. In order, however, to provide a legal defense for any criminal conduct the compulsion must be present and immediate and of such a nature as to induce a well founded fear of impending death or serious bodily harm, and there must be no reasonable opportunity to escape the compulsion without committing the crime or participating in the commission of the crime. If the evidence in the case should leave you with a reasonable doubt whether at the time and place of the alleged offenses the accused acted willingly and voluntarily, that is to say, whether the accused was forced, in effect, to commit or aid in the commission of the crime charged in the indictment by coercion or compulsion as I have explained, then you must acquit the defendant.

And that I believe, ladies and gentlemen, is what I said on both of those subjects. So you may now retire again, if you will.

(The jury left the courtroom at 3:50 p.m. and court recessed.)

(Court reconvened at 5:00 p.m.)

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it at all, and then "III What was Marks" and then a caret "first testimony about going to see his friend in . . . ", and then above the next line is the phrase " . . . West Hartford", and then below that " . . . the Police Department?", and the same undecipherable signature.

Then next in a different handwriting -in fact, that is all printed -- it says "Does the term coercion" and this time it's spelled correctly, "apply only", and that's underscored with three lines, "to 'Government by force' or can it apply as threats or force by others than the Government?" and that is signed by a name that looks like the last name. Anyway, the initial is J and it's B-i-r-or B-e-r-o-n, or some name like that. But the Marshal tells me that when he received this, he said to the Foreman, "You better sign it." So I have a name on the bottom, Theodore -- and it looks like Krol, K-r-o-1, Foreman. That's probably right.

Now, I have some ideas of my own, but I will hear counsel's.

MR. NORRIS: Could we have an opportunity to look at the note, Your Honor?

> THE COURT: (Hands document) All I hear is silence.

 MR. NORRIS: Well, Your Honor, there are a number of questions there. I imagine on the first one about the testimony --

MR. CRAMER: The first question was concerning July 14th - September 4th, the frequency of the phone calls that --

MR. NORRIS: That would be, I guess, that the Stenographer would have to search out the testimony of Mr. Marks and Mr. Conway on that issue.

THE COURT: You are keeping silent or -MR. CRAMER: I agree with that. I agree
that is the issue and I would request that be done.

THE COURT: Any more comments?

MR. NORRIS: Well, Your Honor, I have problems with -- I believe it was the last question on coercion. I believe that perhaps the best thing to do, and my suggestion would be, that the Court instruct the jury that "I have told you what the law is on coercion. If you want it read again, I will read it again." Perhaps the suggestion would be to read it again, but I have trouble with answering the specific question, not any trouble in giving them the law on coercion again.

MR. CRAMER: My response is, Your Honor,

I think that is an important issue and it is obviously

troubling the jury.

THE COURT: Counsel, don't characterize anything by being important. I told the jury in the beginning that everything is important in a criminal case.

MR. CRAMER: I understand. I would ask
that that instruction be re-read with an explanation
that it also concerns coercion by private individuals.

THE COURT: And you have no comments on the other two items?

MR. CRAMER: Well, on the first --

THE COURT: The other two items.

MR. CRAMER: The other two items, on
the September 4th meeting I would ask that a transcript
be made of that testimony and be presented to the
jury.

THE COURT: Of whom?

MR. NORRIS: That would be Mr. Marks and Mr. Weronik, the September 4th meeting.

THE COURT: It doesn't say September 4th.

It says "The first September meeting".

MR. CRAMER: I think the testimony was that was the meeting, September 4th.

THE COURT: Only two people present.

MR. NORRIS: That is correct.

MR. CRAMER: That is correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And the next: "What was

t testimony about going to see his friend

Marks first testimony about going to see his friend in the West Hartford Police Department?"

MR. CRAMER: Of course, that would be solely Mr. Marks' testimony, and I would request that that be made available to the jury.

THE COURT: Do either of you have any feeling at all that these are individual requests of individual jurors or do you think that they are the collective jurors asking for this testimony or asking these questions in different requests?

MR. NORRIS: It is the feeling of the Government that those are requests of individual jurors.

THE COURT: That is my feeling.

MR. NORRIS: That is my concern.

MR. CRAMER: I think they may be requests of the jury as a group with one particular individual advocating and the others agreeing.

THE COURT: That is the rub, as Shakespeare once said.

Are you also familiar with some cases

to the effect that we don't have to give them any

of this re-reading of testimony? Are you, Mr. Norris

MR. NORRIS: Yes, I am, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Are you?

MR. CRAMER: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, I think what I am going to do first is to write a note back asking whether these questions and requests are the requests and questions of the jury as distinguished from individual jurors, and I will first find that out. Do you have any objections to that procedure?

MR. NORRIS: No, Your Honor.

MR. CRAMER: No. I don't, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. Let me try to draft it.

I have drafted this little reply, "I cannot tell whether the various questions and requests are the questions of the jury as a whole or are the requests and questions of individual jurors. Please advise.", with my initials.

Does that cover my problem, do you think?

MR. WORRIS: Yes, Your Honor. No objection.

MR. CHAMER: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

(Court recessed at 10:40 a.m. and reconvened at 11:20 a.m.)

(The jury entered the courtroom at this time.)

THE COURT: I have the answer to my question by the Foreman and he says "All the jury request these to help expedite their decision.", signed by the Foreman, Mr. Krol.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, when I got that note from you I sat down with the Court Reporter and we have been working now for a little over a half hour to try to find what we think you want. I hope you realize it isn't like NBC. We can't play back these things just like they do on television at all. We have to first find them, and the young lady has to go through her notes and read to me what she has and I decide whether this is what you want. And you might be interested that the first question was "We want" or somebody wants "Marks' testimony and Conway's testimony." Well, w have looked at that and it is estimated that that would take, and we have it, two hours to read that.

Now, the next question is what transpired at the meeting and you want the testimony of all persons present at that meeting. The lawyers tell me that only two people were present and we have

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end of the trial and I charge the jury as to what the law is, would you accept from me what I say the law is and not apply your own concepts of what the law is or what it should be? Do you have trouble with that?"

"MR. BUCHANAN: No, but that might be hard to decide beforehand."

"THE COURT: It might be hard to decide?"

"MR. BUCHANAN: I can't say now whether

I would agree with your interpretation of the law."

"THE COURT: Yes. I thought that is

what you meant. Would you tell us your name, please?"

"MR. BUCHANAN: Bradford Buchanan."

"THE COURT: Thank you, sir. Anybody
else? Any other questions? Any suggested questions?
I will excuse Mr. Buchanan from this case, gentlemen.

(Court reconvened at 12:45 p.m.)

THE COURT: Gentlemen, I have a note from the jury which I have already read to the lawyers. It reads: "Please disregard the previous three requests. We" underlined "hopefully resolved them." Signed Theodore Krol, it looks like, K-r-o-l.

Gentlemen, why don't you go to lunch and I will hold everything until you come back.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that a copy of the appellant's brief and appendix to the brief has been hand-carried to the Office of the United States Attorney, 450 Main Street, Hartford, Connecticut 06103, this 4th day of August, 1976.

Richard S. Cramer